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PREFACE 
Today environmental issues have started to sound the alarm siren. It is possible to 
interpret this alarm as an invitation not only for society as a whole but also for people as 
an individual to show the essential sensitivity to the environmental issues. From the 
beginning of 1980s, economists have interested intensively with environmental issues 
and its impact on economic activities. Due to the importance to find a panacea for an 
efficient use of limited resources, the inevitability of the integration of economics into 
policy fields has been put on the agenda. Based on such a sense, the purpose of this 
study is to clarify the relationship between environmental policy, environmental 
technology and market structure. 
Initially, I would like to express my particular appreciations to  my supervisor Assoc. 
Prof. Dr. M. Özgür KAYALICA for his guidance and support.  
I am grateful to Erasmus Exchange Program and Istanbul Technical University for 
giving me the chance to complete my study in Universitê Louis Pasteur. I also would 
like to state my special thanks to  Prof. Dr. Benan Zeki ORBAY and Prof. Dr. Ümit 
SENESEN for supporting me to benefit from Erasmus Program. 
I wish to express my gratitude to my family for their trust and I am deeply indebted to 
my friend Gul for her aid and encouragement.  
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ÖZET 
Bu arastirma optimal çevre politikasi yönetimini farkli pazar yapilarinda, Cournot ve 
Bertrand, teknolojik tasma ve ürün farklilasmasinin oldugu isbirlikçi ve rekabetçi 
çevresel Arastirma ve Gelistirme (Ar-Ge) altinda analiz etmektedir. Emisyon 
yogunlugunu azaltici Ar-Ge ve farklilastirilmis ürünün söz konusu oldugu duopol 
durumunda üç asamali teorik oyun teorisi dikkate alinmistir. Birinci asamada 
hükümet emisyon vergisi ve Ar-Ge sübvansiyonu belirler. Ikinci asamada firmalar 
emisyon vergisini ve Ar-Ge sübvansiyonunu veri alip eszamanli olarak Ar-Ge 
seviyelerini belirler. Üçüncü asamada ise iki durum analiz edilmektedir. Birinci 
durumda Cournot rekabeti altinda firmalar diger her seyi veri olarak alip üretim 
seviyelerini kararlastirir. Bununla beraber, ikinci durumda ise Bertrand rekabeti 
altinda firmalar diger her seyi veri olarak alip fiyat  seviyelerini kararlastirir.. 
 
Her iki pazar yapisinda emisyon vergisinin marjinal hasardan az oldugu 
gösterilmistir. Bununla birlikte, ürün farklilasmasi yeterli derecede az oldugunda 
emisyon vergisi Bertrand rekabetinde marjinal hasara esitlenmektedir. Ar-Ge 
sübvansiyonu konusuna gelince, fiyat rekabetinde sübvansiyon her zaman pozitiftir. 
Miktar rekabetinde ise sübvansiyon ürün farklilasmasina ve teknolojik tasmaya 
dayanmaktadir; isbirlikçi Ar-Ge altinda sübvansiyon daima pozitiftir. Rekabetçi Ar-
Ge ortaminda eger ürün farklilasmasi parametresi yeterince yüksek ve teknolojik  
tasma yeteri kadar düsükse, optimal sübvansiyon negatif olabilir. Aksi takdirde 
optimal sübvans iyon pozitiftir. 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
SUMMARY 
This paper analyses optimal environmental policy rule in different market structures, 
Cournot and Bertrand, under cooperative and competitive environmental R&D when 
technologic spillover and product differentiation exist. A three-stage game theoretic  
model is considered in a differentiated product duopoly where R&D is emission 
intensity reducing. In the first stage, the regulator (government) determines emission 
tax and R&D subsidy. In the second stage, given the emission tax and R&D subsidy 
firms choose their R&D level simultaneously. In the third stage, two cases are 
analyzed. In the first case, firms choose their output levels taking everything else as 
given under Cournot competition. In the second case, however, firms choose their 
price levels taking everthing else as given under Bertrand competition.  
It is demonstrated that emission tax is lower than marginal damage in both market 
structure. Nonetheless, if product differentiation is sufficiently low, emission tax is 
equal to marginal damage in Bertrand competition. With regard to R&D subsidy, 
under price competition subsidy is always positive. Under quantity competition, 
subsidy depends on product differentiation and technologic spillover; subsidy is 
always positive under cooperative R&D. Under competitive R&D if product 
differentiation parameter high enough and technologic spillover parameter is 
sufficiently low, optimal subsidy could be negative. Otherwise, optimal subsidy is 
positive 
. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since last two decades, environmental problems have increased rapidly. In the 
beginning of 1980s, it was realized that quantity and quality of available natural 
resources determine economic and social development in the long run. A change in 
perception in turn leads economic agents to alter their behaviour. Political parties and 
some employers’ organisations shift their main concern by putting the environment 
above work and income in their priority list. In addition, in parallel with this 
consciousness economists attend environmental issues (Dietz et. al., 1991). 
Environmental policy has become one of the most important parts of the applied 
policy and theory.  “It is well known that from the economists’ point of view, 
environmental policy is a case of analysing externalities and market failure issue 
thoroughly examined in microeconomic theory” (Xepapadeas, 1997).  
Regarding this frame on the one hand, firms provide many different products in a 
large range or services to society. However, firms impose a cost on society by 
polluting the air, water, and land. Governments (regulators) overcome negative 
externality by imposing some regulation (emission tax, emission standards, quotas 
etc). They give subsidy to encourage firms to undertake environmental R&D as well. 
Concerning such strategies, a firm might respond by decreasing output level or by 
renovating its technology associated with production methods. Embracing Research 
Joint Venture (RJV) formation, the thesis weighs the probability of forming RJV 
under the umbrella of firms and its implications over firms. 
This aspect of the thesis is assumed to bring in an insight regarding firms’ strategic 
behaviours. Game theory, in this respect, would serve as a brilliant tool to scrutinize 
strategic situations where players (firms) choose different actions in an attempt to 
maximize their returns while government tries to maximize welfare. 
This work aims to contribute to the literature by comparing optimal environmental 
policy in two different markets’ conducts when firms produce
 3 
differentiated products and embrace competitive and cooperative environmental 
R&D. 
This study includes five chapters. After providing a background in the introduction in 
chapter one, chapter two examines the fundamentals of environmental economics 
and the effects of the environmental technology as well. Moreover, previous studies 
about this subject are overviewed. In chapter three, a theoretical model which is used 
to examine our purposes is presented. The model consists of two main parts; 
Bertrand case and Cournot case. In chapter four, these two cases are compared. 
Finally in the last chapter, the results are underlined. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Theoretical Framework  
Economic investigation of environmental policy is based on the idea that effects of 
destructive economic activities on the environment constitute an externality. For the 
precision of this thesis, externality concept should be clarified. What is externality? 
Externality is explained in Deardorff's Glossary of International Economics (2006) as 
the following: “An effect of one economic agent's actions on another, such that one 
agent's decisions make another better or worse off by changing their utility or cost. 
Beneficial effects are positive externalities; harmful ones are negative externalities.” 
A firm imposes a cost on society by polluting the air, water and land. The firm that 
owns the factory has an economic incentive to use labour or steel to the limit that it 
can productively employ, because those inputs are costly to the firm. Those labour 
and steel, which are used up in a given factory, can be assessed as a cost. This cost is 
internalized by the firm due to the fact that the firm has to pay for those inputs. The 
cost society of having some of its labour and steel used up in a given factory is 
internalized by the firm, because it has to pay for those inputs. Nonetheless, the firm 
does not have economic incentive to internalize externality of pollution.  
In fact, environmental problems are due to the variance derived in between the 
private cost and social cost. There cannot be trade-off between environment and the 
production of goods under laissez- faire conditions. In this respect, it is important to 
recognise market failure due to externality.   
Conventional pollution externality leads firms to overproduce. That’s first market 
failure1. Figure 2.1 below points out the effects of a negative externality. Vertical 
                                                 
1 It should be stated that second product market failure is caused by imperfect competition. This in 
turns leads to too little output. 
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distance between the two supply curves indicates a difference between the marginal 
private cost and marginal social cost. The marginal private cost is less than the 
 26 
marginal social cost. In addition, it is supposed that social benefit equals to 
individual benefit. 
 
 
         Source: Wikipedia 4 
        Figure 2.1: Supply & Demand Curves with External Costs  
 
If the consumers take into consideration only their own private cost, they will end up 
at price Pp and quantity Qp, instead of the more efficient price Ps and quantity Qs. 
These latter reflect the idea that the marginal social benefit should equal the marginal 
social cost. That is to say production should be increased only if the marginal social 
benefit exceeds the marginal social cost. As a result, a free market is inefficient; as at 
the quantity Qp, the social benefit is less than the societal cost.  Hence; society as a 
whole would be better off if the goods between Qp and Qs had not been produced. 
The problem is that people are buying and consuming too much. 
There is a dilemma of societal communication and coordination to balance benefits 
and costs. This discussion also indicates that a competitive market is incapable of 
                                                 
4 The figure has been retrieved from World Wide Web: URL 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Negative_externality.jpg 
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solving pollution problem. If one of the firms decides to internalize external costs, 
this firm faces higher costs than those of competitors and is likely to exit the market. 
This situation points out that collective solution is needed; such as government 
intervention for restricting pollution.  
The rest of this section would try to reflect different revisions of the issue with an 
aim to bring in an extent standpoint.   
According to Pigou (1938) the social optimal level can be attained by using policy 
instruments. He has explained his opinion in his works “The Economics of Welfare”. 
In terms of his approach, the divergence between private and social costs can be 
made up by imposing either a tax on emission which creates environmental damages 
or another equivalent measure.  
There is a classical example in which there is a factory generating smoke that has 
harmful effect on individual living nearby. According to Pigou (1938), the factory is 
responsible for damage; therefore, a tax should be imposed so as to reduce smoke 
level and environmental damage. This approach has been dared by Coase (1960).  As 
said by Coase (1960), an optimal agreement on the level of environmental externality 
can be reached without any regulation. This approach is based on bargaining among 
pollutant and the victims of pollutions. In the example of Coase, the factory by 
generating pollution harms the farmer. The factory is voluntary to pay the farmer to 
get right of polluting because of the fact that the factory has to obtain farmer’s 
permission. Thus, the farmer may accept this payment in order to suffer damage 
implied by emissions. The optimal solution can be achieved by private negotiation. 
In this respect, Coase Theorem requires the existence of a well defined and 
enforceable property rights. In this theorem, there are only two parties and no 
transaction costs, which existence can prevent private bargaining. However, 
necessary assumptions for making the theorem valid have been found insufficient 
regarding the majority of environmental problems. That’s why Coase Theorem 
cannot be an alternative to environmental policies which are predicated on Pigovian 
approach (Xepapadeas, 1997). 
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Environmental policy tries to response the internalization of the cost of 
environmental degradation. Environmental policy instruments can be separated into 
two main groups:  
a) Economic instruments (Subsidy, charge system, deposit refund system, tradable 
emission permits etc.) 
b) Regulations (Standards, emission quotas, negotiations etc.) 
Polluters control themselves by regarding consumption of environmental input or 
regulators (governments) impose limit for pollution. The relative efficiency of 
different policy instruments depends on specific considerations such as the regional 
extent of the problem, the number of pollution sources, the easiness of monitoring, 
the importance of transaction costs and the pervasiveness of other market distortions 
(Nicolaisen et al., 1991). The firms generally respond to environmental policy in 
different ways; by decreasing their output level or by changing production methods 
to decrease emission’s level.  
On the contrary, some economists embrace the opinion of environmental 
responsibility instead of environmental taxation. One of the pioneering papers 
written by Bazin et al. (2004) has stated that degree of the responsibility affects 
environmental quality; and high degree of responsibility could be used instead of 
taxation. According to this paper, the fact that polluters pay a tax leads to reveal this 
idea: “Since I pay, I can consume and thus pollute”.  
As a counter argument, also as widely held opinion, is the following: when polluters 
do not pay their environmental cost, this means environmental thievery and thus 
thievery of social welfare. In terms of Bithas (2006), environmental responsibility is 
necessary to form environmental behaviour; it is part of efficient environmental 
policy as well. But it is not enough to impede environmental thievery. 
Going back to previous argument, to internalize negative externality thanks to 
environmental policy for the firms, marginal damage cost is equal to or greater than 
marginal abatement cost (Figure 2.2). Optimal point of emission level is where 
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marginal abatement cost is equal to marginal damage cost. At this point, an increase 
in abatement equals to the gains reduced from emissions. When marginal abatement 
cost is less than marginal damage cost, it leads to an excessive emission level (such 
as point B). In this situation, CE shows total environmental damage. The amounts to 
CD are internalized by the pollutants. But, the amounts to DE of environmental 
damage are not internalized. 
 
 
                              Emission as a fraction of uncontrolled  
                                                        (laissez-faire) level 
Source:  Economics and environment/ a survey of issues and policy options by Joa Nicolaisen et al. (1991) 
Figure 2.2: Abetment cost and damage function  
                   
According to Schwartz and Clements (1999) “From an economic perspective, main 
purpose of subsidies is to reallocate resources, that is, to alter economic activity and 
behaviour to achieve an outcome that is more desirable from what would occur 
otherwise. Hence, arguments for subsidies are often based on some concept of 
efficiency or economic justice”. On the other side, it can not be said that all subsidies 
are corrective in nature even if when subsidies create more desirable outcome. 
Compensating market imperfections is one of the reasons for using subsidies. 
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Subsidies is applied to case where markets do not share out resources efficiently 
because of the fact that owner of these resources cannot reap their full return (i.e. free 
rider problem). Subsidies must be paid for. Thus, it is important that subsidies are 
effective (i.e. reach their intended target group) and realize a given aim at minimum 
cost. 
Subsidies are important elements for environmental policy on the subject of 
environmental technology. They are the main tools of innovation policy as well. In 
the Netherlands, empirical studies show that subsidies have a windfall gain for 
applicants (Kemp, 2000). Thus, it is important that subsidies should be given only if 
the adaptation of cleaner technology entails high costs or causes competitive 
disadvantage owing to more lax regulation in other country. The question “What 
about the effectiveness of subsidies for the development of environmentally 
preferable technologies?” is asked and debated by Kemp. He has studied the question 
with using econometric analysis on the effectiveness of thermal insulation subsidies 
which are given by National Insulation Program. The conclusion has approved that 
there is only weak a positive relationship between the subsidy for thermal home 
improvement and the diffusion of thermal insulation technologies. Some empirical 
examples are given and it is pointed out that in the Netherlands, subsidies have 
limited effect on environmental technology. It is underlined the conclusion of some 
works which have showed that innovator invest environmental technology when they 
believe market exist for the new technology. Investment decision is taken 
irrespectively of subsidies. But also it has been emphasized that it has not been 
studied systematically. 
Firms undertake R&D with the intention of reaching desired emission level by 
reducing either production cost or abatement cost. Namely there are two types of 
R&D: production R&D and environmental R&D. In this work, environmental R&D 
has been taken into consideration. When governments (regulators) impose 
environmental policies to reduce emissions and environmental damage, which 
burdens extra cost for firms, costs increase while outputs decrease. Thus, strict 
environmental policy doesn’t adequately induce the firms to undertake 
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environmental R&D. Firms can form collaboration before undertaking R&D. It is 
called research joint venture (RJV).  
As stated by Caloghirou et al. (2003), joint venture has been defined by OECD “as 
activities in which the operations of two or more firms are partially, but not totally, 
functionally integrated in order to carry out activities in one or more of the following 
areas: i) buying or selling operation; ii) natural resource exploration, development 
and/or production operations; iii) research and development operations; and iv) 
engineering and construction operations”. Even though there are lots of 
collaborations’ forms, most of them are related to technological subjects.  According 
to Caloghirou et al. (2003), there are many works on RJVs. Two of the reasons of 
these works are explained in the following:  
1) Growing willingness of firms to engage in cooperative R&D, which is considered 
as a contradiction to the idea that R&D constitutes the centre of the firms spirit, 
2) RJVs are one of the applications fields for policy. If regulator perceives that 
RJVs are restricting the competition, it imposes policy to prevent this collaboration. 
Whereas policy encourages to RJVs when regulator believes the cooperation is not 
an obstacle to the conditions of competitive markets.  
RJV can be considered as a strategic behaviour among firms. RJV raises the benefit 
of R&D. Veugeler (1998) clarifies RJV’s several advantages, which are in favour of 
firm, in the following: Sharing of costs/risks, access to partner’s know-
how/markets/products, efficiency enhancements, economies of scale in 
production/distribution/R&D, synergy effects from exchanging/sharing 
complementary know-how, competitive considerations, monitor/control partner’s 
technology/markets/products, influence other alliance activities (pre-emption, 
followers), influence competitive structure, government policy (industrial, trade & 
competition policy), subsidies for co-operation, local content and anti-trust. 
Anti-trust or competition laws are defined in Wikipedia Web Encyclopedia as “laws 
whose state purpose is the promotion of economic and business competition by 
prohibiting anti-competitive behaviour and unfair business practises”. 
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Röller et al. (1997) asked question in their works as “why firms form research joint 
venture?” This work underlines two main reasons in the economics literature.  
(i) Internalising the spillovers associated with R&D 
(ii) Cost saving by sharing R&D costs. 
Internalising spillovers is an effective way to overcome free-rider problem. Firms are 
less incentive and spend less on RJV owing to free rider behaviour. If firms form 
RJV with choosing R&D investment level cooperatively to maximize joint venture, 
spillovers are internalised and these result leads to an optimal R&D investment and 
raise welfare. Cost sharing also is powerful incentive as it fallows firm to pool their 
resources and avoid wasteful duplication. (Firms within an industry may be pursuing 
the same invention, using the same method and thus replicating effort). It is showed 
that RJVs affect market structure and market power. Moreover, large firms have less 
incentive to form RJV with smaller firms to increase market power. Hence, industry 
becomes increasingly asymmetric. In this regards, RJV may raise competitive 
concerns. One of the conclusions is that if firms produce similar products, they do 
not tend to form RJV. 
Jaffe et al. (2002) has examined the relationship between technological change and 
environmental policy. There are two results: 
1) Environmental effects on society and on economic activity are affected by the 
rate and the direction of technological change. 
2) Environmental policy interventions generate new restraints and incentives, which 
affect technological development. 
A development of environmental technology reduces the cost of pollution abatement 
and thus pollution. Environmental health is improved as well. This is a static story. 
But in fact there are dynamic stories between environmental policy and technology.  
Policies reduce pollution at present, and induce firms to invest in new technologies 
for the future. Development of technology changes cost/benefit analysis. 
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Environmental policies take this dynamic interaction into consideration. The static 
model does not consider the fact that technology is not free (Jaffe et al., 2004). 
At this point, to understand RJV better, it should be focused on R&D market failures. 
There are three R&D market failures: 
1) Firms take into consideration their profits more than total surplus, which in turn 
leads to too little R&D. 
2) If one of the firms gets new technology, it does not want to share it with the other 
firm in the same industry. Hence, there occurs too little R&D once more. 
3) Firms try to be the first to introduce new technology and therefore to capture all 
private benefits. This leads to over- investment in R&D. 
If there is uncontrolled information leakage (spillover), firms acting independently 
will not internalize owing to spillover. This is called spillover effect. Thus, in the 
situation where there is enough (high) spillover, firms tend to under invest R&D. 
As Katsoulacos et al. (1999) mentions, firms cope with R&D market failure through 
RJV. Hence, they take R&D decision cooperatively. They handle not only spillover 
effect but also second and third R&D failures. But RJV is incapable of overcoming 
first R&D failure. 
Environmental policy may induce firms to innovate either by adopting existing 
environmental appropriate technology or by accomplishing more and newer R&D. 
Even in this situation, environmental policy should consider external effect induced 
by innovation, market distortions in R&D market, free riding induced by R&D 
spillover and benefit & cost of R&D cooperation (Carraro and  Metcalf, 2000).  
According to Ulph (1999), it can be divided five the review related about RJV:  
i) Performance of RJVs ii) RJVs size and membership iii) Interaction between RJVs 
and product market competition iv) The evaluation of RJVs and RJV policy v) 
Innovation and competition. 
2.2. An Overview and Review of Previous Studies 
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Chiou and Hu (2001) have examined the firms’ strategic behaviour under emission 
tax. In their paper, three types of environmental RJV are considered:  
1) R&D cartelization in which firms choose R&D efforts to maximize the joint 
profit. 
2) RJV competition in which firms share the R&D fruits to maximize their own 
profits. 
3) RJV cartelization in which firms share R&D fruits and maximize the joint profit. 
Supposed by the model of this paper, there are two firms that produce homogenous 
product. These firms generate pollution. There are two different games. In the first 
game, a duopoly is examined without environmental RJV. The game includes two 
stages. In the first stage, the firms choose their pollution abatement level. In the 
second stage, they choose their output level. In the second game, there are three 
general types of RJV. The first type of RJV is the R&D cartelization. In the first 
stage of the second game, the two firms coordinate in the environmental abatement 
level in order to maximize their joint profit although there is no spillover of the 
abatement technology. In the second stage, the two firms engage in Cournot quantity 
competition. The second type of RJV is the RJV competition. In the first stage 
involving this type of RJV, the two firms spread abatement technology to each other 
in order to maximize their own profits; but not to attain joint profit. In the second 
stage, the two firms engage in Cournot quantity competition. The third type of RJV 
is the RJV cartelization; that is, in the first stage, the two firms share abatement 
technology each other in order to maximize the joint profit. Finally, in the second 
stage, the two firms engage in Cournot quantity competition. 
This paper shows that environmental RJV doesn’t always improve the social welfare; 
because the firms in RJV cartelisation reduce their output level and environmental 
R&D level to maximize joint profits. In addition, such a cartelisation can be regarded 
as a social optimal when spillover is sufficiently high. Because of the fact that there 
is free-riding effect, an environmental RJV competition with high enough spillover 
coefficient will bring the lowest social surplus. A RJV cartelization has a negative 
 35 
impact on the total output, on per output abatement and on social surplus. However, a 
RJV cartelization with a high rate of environmental technological spillover 
maximizes social-surplus. Thus, antitrust law enforcers should pay attention whether 
the members of an environmental RJV are substantially sharing environmental 
innovations or not. Moreover they should allow joint profit maximization to 
eliminate the free-riding effect. In many countries, R&D cooperation is supported 
under antitrust laws, which effects in promoting R&D and production efficiency 
exceed the inefficiency resulting from the reduction in competition. 
Greenlee (2005) has studied RJV in empirically studies. It is underlined that principal 
benefit of RJV is accessing to the innovation venture partners. This leads to reduce 
cost. RJV’s structure and spillovers affect directly partner’s behaviours. When 
spillovers are low and joint venture membership is small, members increase R&D 
expenditure which is used for getting greater sales volume. Additionally benefit of 
the new innovations is not transmitted too largely to rivals or to partners. When 
spillover or number of participants increase, individual research affects overspread 
largely, so this in turn leads to smaller cost advantages. Thus, participant in venture 
invests less in R&D. But participant benefits from increased level of effective R&D 
thanks to sharing with additional firms. It is also found that sharing information is 
better for welfare than joint venture that maximizes joint profit. Under the 
circumstance spillovers are low, R&D sharing venture improve welfare. When there 
is single industry wide joint venture, it improves social welfare by increasingly total 
effective R&D. If there are several competing joint ventures, any collaboration 
reduces R&D. 
Chen (2005) has examined the relation between RJV and financial structure. If cost 
reduction due to R&D is uncertain, the use of strategic debt in RJV competition 
induces the firm to high effort for in R&D. When the firms use debt, their R&D 
effort and output level increases. Because the firms would like to cover debt 
obligation through producing more and capturing a bigger market share. The use of 
debt weakens free rider problem. The firms do not have intensive to trick; whereas 
they make effort to cope with free rider problem because of strategic debt.  
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Furthermore, each firm’s profit is less owing to higher R&D expenditure and lower 
market price than in the unleveraged industry although production cost is reduced 
and free rider problem is weakened when the firms use debt.  
In the presence of asymmetries between firms, how do the firms choose their 
collaboration partners? And how is important the technology of competitor? Atallah 
(2005) has tried to find the answers of these questions. When firms choose their 
partner, they consider spillover and cost differences. A firm wants to form 
collaboration with the most efficient firms, if low spillover exists. Cost difference 
between firms increases between firms; efficient firms prefer to collaborate with the 
most efficient firm among remaining firms. Whereas, in the situation of high 
spillovers, a firm prefers to remain out of collaboration but if cost differentiation is 
sufficiently low, firms tend to collaborate. It is also attained that larger firms with 
high technologic capabilities profit from R&D cooperation. 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) have obtained some conclusions related about RJV. 
Principals of them are: 
i) Cost reduction is the most important reason to form RJV(eliminating 
duplication effort) 
ii) If products are very close substitute or firms are so willingness to share 
information. Cost considerations tend to be dominant factor 
iii)  RJV might close one lab to prevent from facing very competitive situation 
when both firms discover.  
iv) RJV may keep both of labs to get benefit of maximum when firms are 
different but complementary industries. 
v) Eliminating needless duplication and diminishing returns of R&D 
expenditure are cost reasons for having two labs. 
Chiroleu-Assouline et al. (2003) has compared different instruments (emission tax, 
emission standards and auctioned permits) of environmental policy according to the 
incentives for innovation and embracing of new technology when environmental 
technology and imperfect competition exist. In this works, it is assumed that 
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regulator knows market structure and emission level of the each firm but it is 
unconscious about consequence of research effort. The other assumption involves the 
permits to pollute, which are auctioned by government. The firms are mindful about 
how many permits they need with innovation or without innovation. They are also 
aware of the fact that the price of the permits is determined by the perfectly 
competitive of permits market. They have found that emission tax reduces total 
pollution but the innovation does not always induce to reduce pollution. If the firms 
adopt innovation, there are two effects for firms; decreasing in emission by reducing 
emission coefficient (direct effect) and reduction of environmental cost which brings 
on decrease production cost. This in turns increases production and emissions    
(indirect effect). These two effects depend  on emission tax. If there are excessive 
taxes with innovation, pollution reduction is smaller for the situation where 
innovation exists than the situation on the contrary. It is underlined that three policy 
arguments can not be ranged on the subject of incentive to innovate, the size of 
innovation, acceptability of environmental policy and total welfare. Ranking depends 
on for a given criteria. 
Montero (2002) has studied whether or not there is any difference regarding 
incentive to invest in environmental R&D under different market structure and 
environmental policy instruments.(emission standards, emission tax, tradable permits 
and auctioned permits).  The model of the firm has two stages. In the first stage, 
firms choose their R&D level; in the second stage they choose their output. It is 
assumed that there two symmetric firms and limit of the emission level is determined 
exogenously. Firms’ products are strategic substitutes in Cournot competition while 
they are strategic complements in Bertrand competition.  One of the conclusions  
points out that standards, emission tax or auctioned permits can procure the most 
incentive to invest R&D in Cournot competition. As for Bertrand competition, either 
tax or auctioned permits provide the most incentives. If markets are perfectly 
competitive, permits and emission standards have lower incentives than tax. It is 
emphasized that under Cournot competition, if products are strategic substitutes, 
under tradable permits regulation, firms have an incentive to under- invest in R&D. If 
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firms are in auctioned permit regulation, the firms may have incentive to over-invest 
in R&D. 
Lee (1999) has tried to find the answer of the  question that is “What is the optimal 
output tax for polluting oligopolistic firms?”  In this work, it is assumed market 
structure is determined endogenously,- free entry- firms are identical and products are 
homogenous. He has found that optimal tax under imperfect competition could be 
less than, equal to or greater than marginal external damage depending on curve of 
market demand. This conclusion is explained in that way; equilibrium number of 
firm could be below or above social optimum. For correcting this distortion, 
emission tax would be greater or less than marginal external damage. The study has 
emphasized that optimal tax equal to marginal external damage for symmetric 
oligopolists when market demand is linear. 
Poyago-Theotoky (2000) has approached the relationship between environmental 
policy and innovation by using the argument of willingness. The firms commit more 
environmental R&D, sacrifice their profit and reduce production. This is qualified 
Voluntary Approach (V.A.). In this work, she assumed there exists duopoly and 
closed economy. The firms which are identical produce homogeny product. To 
answer the question of “What is the relation between ER&D and non-cooperative 
R&D and how do these formations have performance relatively in terms of 
environmental innovation and social welfare?” it is used three-stage game. In first 
stage, firms decide whether they or not form R&D organisation, in the second stage 
the regulator set environmental tax (as a tool of environmental policy) and in the last 
stage firms compete in market. 
It has been attained that environmental innovation is greater in ERC than in 
independent R&D in the case of relatively small damage, whereas large damage 
opposite is true. This conclusion holds for comparison of social welfare. As for 
environmental tax, it is greater in the situation of independent R&D than in ERC for 
small damage. If there exists a large damage, the ranking is opposite. 
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David (2004) has compared voluntary agreement (V.A.) and emission tax as an 
environmental policy under Cournot competition. The regulator offers a contract to 
firms to limit their emission by determining specific level. The firms accept or reject. 
If firm refuse they must pay emission tax. While the regulator is determining 
emission level, he takes into consideration social welfare maximization. V.A. do not 
affect output always leads to higher abatement than tax. V.A. lets the firms avoid tax 
payment ; thus marginal production cost is reduced compared to the tax. That’s means 
higher output, hence consumer surplus is always higher with the V.A.  V.A. lets the 
firms to obtain higher profit compared to tax depends on the level of threat. 
Nonetheless, it can not be said emission level. Because on the one hand, V.A. causes 
more abatement than tax on the other hand it causes highe r output and higher 
emissions.  
Beath et al. (1998) has studied the relation between spillovers and R&D. It is showed 
that the effect of the spillover on the R&D depends on how significant the spillover 
is and what type of research is pursued. According to this study, RJV always gets a 
large amount of cost reduction than the independent firms and as a result spend more 
on R&D but, in every situation, the amount of R&D spending per unit of cost 
reduction lower in RJV than non cooperative R&D thanks to elimination needless 
duplications. In this study, R&D is separated as two stages for examining effect of 
the diminishing returns correct. In the first stage firms incur expenditure that will 
generate new knowledge while in the second stage this knowledge is engaged to 
reduce unit costs. In the first stage, firms determine how many labs they use. If there 
is a single research path, the RJV operates one lab in order to eliminate needless 
duplication. If there are complementary research paths, the number of labs (one or 
two) depend the stage of the R&D process in which diminishing returns happen. 
They found that RJV operates both labs when diminishing returns occur at the first 
stage (creation of knowledge), whereas it will be indifferent related about the number 
of the labs when diminishing returns occur in the second stage (Cost reduction); 
because, it is proportionally more difficult to invent new technologies. It economizes 
a lot on physical inputs. 
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In the work of Poyago-Theotoky (1999), it is compared R&D competition and R&D 
cooperation (RJV) when spillovers are endogen. There are two identical firms which 
produce homogeny products and undertake cost reducing R&D. The model includes 
three stages. In the first stage, firms decide their R&D expenditure, in the second 
stage; firms decide how much of the knowledge created in the first stage and the last 
stage they compete in Cournot competition. The firms share full information and 
maximize RJV profit in RJV. To conclude, total output and the profits of the firms 
are higher in R&D cooperation than in R&D competition. That means consumer 
surplus, producer surplus and consequently welfare is more in RJV than in R&D 
competition.  It is underlined that in the case of R&D competition, when spillover 
equal to zero, the profits of the firm will maximum as well. Because, positive 
spillover reduces rival’s unit cost and increases its market share, hence reduces its 
own profitability.  
 
Albrecht (1999) has compared several environmental policy instruments including 
emission tax, vo luntary agreement, grandfather and auctioned permits in terms of the 
incentive to invest in environmental R&D. There are two sectors, polluting firms 
which are not identical –different marginal abatement cost-and investing firms in 
R&D. It has into taken considerations the decision to innovate and the marketing of 
the resulting innovations as endogenous. It is assumed as well that firms want to 
invest in innovation if the cost of innovation does not exceed a critical value which is 
determined the discounted profits from innovation. If the polluters are ready to pay 
more the price of technology, they buy and install new technology. The quantity of 
solving technologies depends on the effective need to reduce emission. Thus, the  
effects of environmental policy instruments on firms are important. If emission target 
is strict, that’s in turns to force the polluters to obtain new technologies which are 
presented by innovators. He has attained that the market created by emission tax is 
always more important than the market created by tradable permits. Because 
Tradable permits aim only to reduce emission .Moreover, it is highlighted that 
emission taxes is the most incentive instrument to invest in environmental R&D. 
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Yun et al. (2000) have studied several type R&D organisation including independent 
R&D, R&D coordination, R&D consortium and RJV in terms of technologic  
improvement and social welfare. In the situation of independent R&D, each firm 
chooses their R&D level to maximize its profit. In the case of R&D coordination 
firms do not share research input – output information, only corporate in deciding 
their R&D level. As for R&D consortium the firms share their research input – 
output but determine their R&D level independently. Finally, in RJV the firms share 
research input – output and maximize joint profit. There are two kinds of externality; 
positive (spillover and output sharing) and negative (input sharing). Input and output 
sharing are given exogenously. The analysis is performed two stage model of 
duopolistic competition. In the first stage, firms choose their R&D organisation and 
at the last stage they compete in output market. In this paper, it has been attained that 
either independent R&D or R&D consortium can be more effective in terms of R&D 
investment than R&D coordination or RJV. But it could not be stated any dominance 
uniquely of any form of R&D organisation which depends on spillovers, degree of 
competition and input-output sharing rate of R&D consortium and RJV.  Such as, if 
the product market is competitive, independent R&D is superior to any R&D 
organisation. Nonetheless, if competition is weak, cooperative R&D regime may be 
preponderance according to technologic improvement and social welfare. In 
particular, when input sharing rate is relatively high, R&D consortium will be 
dominant to RJV. 
“What can be said related to different market structures in terms of price, and  
welfare?”. Hackner (1999) has tried to answer this question. He allows product 
vertical and horizontal product differentiation. But firms have the same marginal cost 
of production. He has attained that Cournot price is higher than Bertrand price 
regardless of goods are complement or substitutes. Namely, welfare is always higher 
under price competition. In addition, Cournot profit is higher than Bertrand profits; 
whereas when products are complements, the conclusion is opposite. If there are n 
firms instead of two, when goods are complements and quality difference are large, 
low quality firms will charge higher prices under Bertrand competition than under 
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Cournot competition. If goods are substitutes, high quality firms might earn higher 
profits under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. He has 
underlined that if the model extent from two firms to n firms, the difference under 
two competitions disappears. Thus,  in this situation, it is not clear which type of 
competition is more efficient. 
Symeonidis (2002) has compare Bertrand case and Cournot case in a differentiated 
oligopoly with spillover. He has emphasized that it exists two types of 
differentiations; vertical and horizontal differentiation. First is due to product R&D. 
It implies quality differentiation and affects directly gross consumer surplus by 
increasing product qualities. On the other hand horizontal differentiation indicates 
substantiality. In the model, there are two firms which produce differentiated 
products. It has been described two stage game. In first stage firms choose their 
product R&D level and in the last stage they determine their prices or quantities. As 
for conclusion which has been obtained, comparative advantage depends on R&D 
spillover and product differentiation.  R&D expenditure, price and firm’s profits are 
always higher under Cournot model than under Bertrand model. Moreover, output, 
consumer surplus and total welfare are higher in the case of Bertrand than in the case 
of Cournot if either R&D spillovers are weak or products are sufficiently 
differentiated. If R&D spillovers are strong and products are not too differentiated, 
output, consumer surplus and total welfare are lower in price competition than 
quantity competition. 
Poyago-Theotoky (2003) has examined the effect of the degree of product 
differentiation and optimal environmental policy in Cournot competition and in 
Bertrand competition. As an environmental policy analzed in this paper, subsidy and 
emission tax are utilized on environmental R&D. The model of the paper consists of 
three stages. At the first stage, the government sets emission tax and environmental 
R&D subsidy. At the second stage, firms choose their environmental R&D level 
simultaneously. At the last stage, they set output or price taking as a given emission 
tax and R&D subsidy. This paper has showed that the emission tax is always lower 
than marginal damages in Cournot competition while the emission tax is generally 
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lower than marginal damages in Bertrand Competetion. In addition, Cournot 
emission tax is always lower than Bertrand emission tax. The case of  nearly 
homogeneous products indicates that the emission tax is equal to marginal damages 
with price competition. Moreover, subsidy depends on the degree of product 
differentiation. In terms of this work’s alaysis, the optimal policy mix consists of an 
emission tax and a R&D subsidy. Furthermore this paper has reached the fact that if 
there is constrain such as linear marginal damage, the second-best tax under Bertrand 
competition always exceeds the second-best tax under Cournot competition. 
A similar comparison for the case of the R&D subsidy reveals that whether the R&D 
subsidy is higher or lower in quantity or price competition depends crucially on the 
degree of product differentiation and on initial emissions.  
Poyago-Theotoky and Petrakis (2002) have showed that when emission tax is 
determined exogenously, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative  depending on 
the degree of environmental damage and spillover parametre. Also this paper has 
indicated that welfare, in the case of R&D cooperation, is lower than welfare in the 
case of R&D subsidisation. The model of the paper is non-tournament in which there 
are duopoly firms producing homogenous goods under constant returns and also in 
which there is R&D spillover. Two different games exist. In the first game, there are 
three stages; at the first stage the government sets subsidy rate. At the second stage, 
firms choose their abatement level and how much to spend in cost reducing R&D. At 
the last stage, firms compete in product market by choosing their output level. 
Coming to the second game, subsidy doesn’t exist; firms cooperate by choosing their 
cost reducing R&D level in order to maximize joint profits. However, they compete 
in product market. It is assumed that the firms generate pollution as a by product and 
technology policy is exogeneous, namely emission tax is fixed.  
The paper handled by Poyago-Theotoky and Petrakis (1999) has focused on the 
impact of two different policies; R&D subsidy and R&D cooperation in a duopoly 
model with cost reducing R&D, spillovers and abatement. Shortly, it can be said that 
the aim of this paper is to demystify the debate about which policy is better than the 
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other. For investigating the aim which is determined, they have used two differents 
model. In the first game, government sets R&D subsidy, firms choose their 
abatement level and firms compete in product market respectively. In the second 
game, firms cooperate in cost reducing R&D to maximize joint profit  and compete 
in product market. It  has been assumed that firms generate pollution as a by product, 
emission tax is endogenous, firms produce homogenous product. It has showed that 
R&D subsidy can be negative.This depends on spillover and environmental damage. 
The other conclusion is that welfare in the case of  R&D is lower than in the case of 
R&D subsidization. 
Katsoulacos et al. (1996) have examined that the optimal policy is a combination of 
R&D subsidy and emission tax when the firms generate pollution and technologic 
spillover exist. In the model of this paper, there are environmental R&D spillovers, 
pollution generating duopoly firms acting under Cournot competition and 
homogenous product. According to this work, the optimal tax is less than marginal 
damages while the subsidy depends on the deviation between emission taxes and 
marginal damages. It has been underlined that the firms have incentive to undertake 
environmental R&D only if there exists emission tax. They have found that when 
spillovers are sufficiently small, the optimal subsidy may be negative and when 
emission tax increases, output level decreases while abatement expenses increase. 
This work has highlighted three causes of the environmental R&D undertaken 
privately to deviate from social optimal R&D: i) firms do not consider consumer 
surplus, so they produce suboptimal output ii) Environmental spillover iii) Strategic 
effect. Firms tend to over- invest in environmental R&D so as to increase their market 
share. If the first two factors dominate over the third, optimal subsidy is positive. If 
spillover is small, the strategic effect dominates, and then negative subsidy should be 
necessary. 
Poyago-Theotoky (2005) has studied the importance of environmental R&D, which 
is directed towards emission reduction of harmful pollutants, and which are 
associated with social welfare. The firms undertake R&D expenditure for reducing 
their emission level before the regulator sets emission tax. Namely, there is voluntary 
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approach for firms to reduce emissions. Regulator follows time-consistent policy. 
The study has focused on two different regimes related to R&D organisation: 
1) Independent R&D;   
2) Environmental R&D cartel.  
Moreover, it has been assumed that there are spillovers in the R&D process so that a 
firm can benefit from the R&D effort of its rival at no cost to itself. Due to the 
negative externality, firms tend to over produce. So, government impose emission 
tax to prevent this market failure. Market structure is duopolistic. In the model, there 
are two scenarios. In the first scenario, there are three stages game. At the first stage, 
firms opt their environmental R&D level non-cooperatively; at the second stage, 
regulator sets emission tax; and at the last stage, firms compete in the market by 
choosing their output level. In the second scenario, firms form environmental R&D 
cartel at the first stage only; other stages remain the same.  
This work has come to the conclusion that in the case of environmental R&D cartel 
(ERC), when environmental damage is low, environmental R&D is higher compared 
to independent R&D. If environmental damage is high, the conclusion is the 
opposite. The same proposition can be said about social welfare. Furthermore, this 
paper has paid attention to the fact that if there are n-firms in the market, which 
affects deeply relation of between environmental policy and the organisation of 
environmental R&D. Furthermore, this paper has paid attention to the fact that if 
there are n-firms in the market, which affects deeply the relation between 
environmental policy and the organisation of environmental R&D, free-rider 
problem would be more severe. Therefore, ERC would make more effort on 
environmental R&D.  
Roy Chowdhruy (2002) has analyzed the interaction between environmental policy, 
market structure and level of the pollution. He has considered duopoly market 
structure where the firms endogenously decide to form joint venture. In this paper 
market structure is determined endogenously .Due to pollution, government imposes 
emission tax, which creates abatement cost for the firms. It is assumed that one firm 
 46 
supplies capital while the other supplies labour in joint venture. In the model, there 
are two stages. At the first stage, firms decide whether to choose Cournot 
competition or joint venture formation. Joint venture can be formed only if two firms 
choose it. At the second stage, in the case of Cournot, firms simultaneously choose 
their output level; however, in the case of joint venture case; firms choose 
simultaneously the level of input supply for the joint venture. Then, the government 
determines optimal tax.  
Two components of joint venture have been analyzed; synergy and moral hazard. If 
two firms form joint venture, it leads to cost reduction due to synergy. Moreover, two 
advantages of the joint venture have been mentioned; gain from synergy and 
avoiding loss of rents. As for moral hazard, when the capital and labour supply reach 
big amount in joint venture, it’s impossible to control these labour and capital flows. 
Also that cannot be at the contract. The firms begin to pay attention more on their 
own profit than on joint venture. Thus, free rider problem appears which leads to less 
level of input supply than optimum. The conclusion of this work can be summarized 
as the following; the pollution level depends on market structure and government 
regulation. If government policy is strict, Cournot competition is better than joint 
venture formation rega rding the pollution. If the government policy is weak, joint 
venture formation is better than Cournot competition. Furthermore, if the synergetic 
effect is large, strict regulation causes an increase on the level of pollution, which 
leads to regime switch from joint venture to Cournot competition. For a given market 
structure, the optimal tax is less than marginal social damage. If the industry is not 
excessively polluting, by means of manipulating emission tax the first best outcome 
can be realized (under joint venture formation). If the industry is polluting, second 
best tax might or might not be equal to the optimal tax under either joint venture or 
Cournot competition. 
Katsoulacos et al. (1999) has analyzed the impact of environmental policy on the 
performance of environmental RJV. In this paper, it has been examined that how 
environmental policy affects environmental innovation when the firms form 
environmental RJV. Especially it has focused on a comparison made between the 
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impact of environmental policy on innovative performance of RJV and non-
cooperative equilibriums. In the model, two firms are considered which generate 
pollution by producing dirty goods. Due to environmental externality, government 
imposes emission tax. In line with the model, information sharing is determined 
endogenously besides the numbers of the lab operated endogenously. There are 
seven-stage in the game;  
1) Government decides whether or not to allow RJV.  
2) If RJVs are allowed, firms choose whether or not to form one. 
3) Firms choose the number of labs to operate. At this stage, if the two firms act non-
cooperatively, each of them operates their own independent lab. If they form a RJV; 
then, at stage 3, they can choose either to continue to operate one lab each, or to 
operate a single combined lab. 
4) Firms choose the amount of R&D to do in each lab. At this stage, the amount of 
R&D is determined by the lab conditional on the probability to discover a new 
technology. 
5) Conditioning on the outcome of the R&D decisions. Firms choose whether or not 
to share information. This stage depends on stage 4. There are three possibilities for 
the outcome of stage 4.  
6) The government sets environmental taxes t00, t10, t11 conditioning on the 
technology that each firm has as a result of the outcomes of stages 4 and 5. In this 
stage, three possible situations appear depending on which technology the firms each 
has. 
7) Firms choose output in a non-cooperative Cournot Equilibrium.  
In this stage, the firms choose their output level non-cooperatively under Cournot 
competition. 
This game has been solved by backward induction. The conclusions can be expressed 
as the following: Due to the failure to make the right- information-sharing decisions, 
to operate the right number of labs – so have excessive duplication of effort and due 
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to incorrect R&D decisions taken through under- or over- investment, welfare losses 
appear. Furthermore, it has been shown that;  
a) Information-sharing is more likely when damage occurs and taxes are low. 
b) When damage is low, RJVs perform better in R&D decision-making than it does 
under the non-cooperative equilibrium. This situation depends on two reasons. 
Firstly, since the returns to R&D are high, they are more likely to avoid the risk of 
needless duplication. Secondly, the loss occurred from under- investment of the RJV 
is smaller than the loss occurred from over- investment in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. 
c) As damage rises, the under- investment of the RJV increases and the over-
investment in the non-cooperative equilibrium falls. A questionable conclusion is 
that RJVs do better than non-cooperative organisation when environmental damage 
is low; but when environmental damage is high, RJV is worse. 
Oladunjoye (2005) has examined two environmental policies (subsidy and tax) under 
competitive R&D and under cooperative R&D organisation in a heterogeneous 
product market. According to the model, the firms generate pollution and face tax on 
emission at a rate per unit of emission in a duopoly structure and the government 
gives a subsidy to encourage the firms to invest in environmental R&D. There are 
technologic spillover and product differentiation. The model includes three stage 
game. In the first stage, the regulator sets a tax on emission at a rate per unit of 
emissions and subsidizes R&D at a rate s per unit of R&D investment. In the second 
stage, the firms choose their level of R&D simultaneously. In the final stage, they 
choose their output under Cournot competition taking the emission tax and subsidy 
as given by the regulator. What have been compared are the optimal emission taxes, 
subsidies and social welfare under both R&D arrangements.  
This work has demonstrated the fact that the second-best emission tax is less than 
marginal damages under both environmental R&D. In addition, on the one hand, the 
subsidy has also been found to be strictly positive under cooperative R&D. Though, 
under competitive R&D it is only positive for high spillovers. On the other hand, if 
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spillover is low, subsidy is negative. Under the assumption of exogenous emissions 
tax and constant marginal damage shows that, for sufficiently low spillovers, optimal 
subsidy under cooperative ER&D should be greater than under competitive 
environmental R&D. This result also holds for high spillovers and highly 
differentiated products. This will discourage free riding on R&D investments among 
firms and it helps to reduce emission costs. Such a reduction leads to an increase on 
R&D levels, which minimize emissions and helps correct output market failure. 
However, optimal subsidy under cooperative R&D should be less than what is 
obtained under competitive environmental R&D for high spillovers and less 
differentiated products.  
Using numerical computation, for sufficiently low product substitutability, optimal 
emission tax under environmental R&D cooperation should be less than optimal 
emissions tax under competitive environmental R&D; while the subsidy under 
cooperative environmental R&D should be more than the subsidy under competitive 
environmental R&D, which may be negative for low environmental R&D spillover. 
This will encourage the coordination of environmental R&D investments among 
firms while the subsidy helps to lessen environmental R&D expenditure. Thus, a 
decrease on expenditure gives way to an increase on environmental R&D levels that 
helps to correct output market failure. For sufficiently low spillover effects and high 
product differentiation, optimal emission tax under environmental R&D cooperation 
should also be lower than the optimal emission tax under environmental R&D 
competition; while the optimal subsidy under environmental R&D cooperation 
should be higher than the optimal subsidy under environmental R&D competition. 
However, the reverse is correct for sufficiently high spillovers and high product 
differentiation. 
To conclude, regardless of the degree in product differentiation, if spillover is small, 
environmental R&D cooperation is socially desirable. Nevertheless, if there is a high 
spillover effect and products are less differentiated, competitive R&D is socially 
desirable. 
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3. THE MODEL  
In this model, a duopoly is considered as a market where firms sell differentiated 
products and compete either by setting quantities or by setting prices.   
The firms face inverse demand function as shown by the following equation,   
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or direct demand function as indicated by the subsequentequation: 
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where i, j = 1, 2, i.¹j and 0fA . Parameter g indicates the degree of product 
differentiation and 10 ££ g . The fact that y is close to zero ( )0®g  represents 
perfectly differentiated goods and local monopolist firms. If g  gets close to one 
( )1®g ,  the goods become very similar (in the limit they become homogeneous). 
We assume that unit production costs, c, are constant while there are no fixed costs 
and normalizing unit costs by setting c equals to zero.  The firms generate pollution 
by producing. 
Emission per unit output     
jii zzee .0 b--=                                                                                                       (3)  
i = 1, 2, i ?  j, where zi represents firm i’s environmental R&D level which is directed 
towards emission reduction of harmful pollutants and 0e  represents initial emissions 
per unit of output. Additionally, b  shows the degree of technological spillover 
between the firms. 
10 ££ b and it is assumed that  ji zze .0 b+³  for any iz  and jz . Environmental 
R&D expenditure for firm i, 2..5,0 izR d=                                                                 (4)    
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iz  represents firm i’s environmental R&D level. The firm i  has to spend an amount 
R  to reach environmental technological level iz . The symbol of  d captures the 
relative efficiency of environmental R&D. It should not be ignored that 
environmental R&D cost function indicates diminishing returns to environmental 
R&D.  
Total emissions can be figured as the following 
( )å +==
i
jiii qeqeqeE ... 21                                                                                      (5) 
To make clear the symbols, it should be said that D represents environmental damage 
and equals to ( )fji qeqeD .. 21 +=  where f  represents marginal disutility. The 
government has also environmental policy tools; emission tax and subsidy. Due to 
pollution caused by firms’ production, government imposes emission tax at a rate t 
per unit of emission. Futhermore, government gives subsidy at a rate s per unit of 
R&D investment  so as to encourage the firms to invest in environmental R&D.   
In this model a three stage game is considered in a differentiated product duopoly 
where R&D is emission intensity reducing. In the first stage, the regulator 
(government) determines emission tax and R&D subsidy. In the second stage, given 
the emission tax and R&D subsidy firms choose their R&D levels simultaneously. In 
the third stage, two cases are analyzed. In the first case, firms choose their output 
levels taking everything else as given under Cournot competition. In the second case; 
however, firms choose their price levels taking everything else as given under 
Bertrand competition. 
3.1.  COURNOT  CASE 
3.1.1. Under Competitive R&D  
3.1.1.1.  Stage 3 
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Given the policy scheme (t,s) announced by the governments and the choice of R&D 
effort in emission reduction iz , firm i maximizes following  profit by choosing its 
output level; 
( ) ( ) ( ) 22 ..5,0.1......5.0.1... iiiijiiiiii zsqetqqqAzsqetqP dgdp -----=---=      (6) 
The first order condition is obtained as follows, 
2
..
0...2 jiiiji
i
i
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q
g
g
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=Þ=---=
¶
¶
                                              (7)  
 
The reaction functions are obtained as follows,   
    
( )
2
... 0 jji
i
qzzetA
q
gb ----
=                                                                               (8a)    
 
( )
2
... 0 iij
j
qzzetA
q
gb ----
=                                                                               (8b)    
 
Solving simultaneously  eq.(8a) and (8b) Cournot-Nash eq.output levels are obtained 
as follows,  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
2
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...2...2..2
g
gbbgg
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=* jii
ztztetA
q  , { }ji,  = { }2,1 , i ¹  j               (9)                                
 
*
iq  is Cournot-Nash Equilibrium output 
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( ) 22 ..1.5,0 iii zsq dp --=  ip is overall profit.5                                                                (10)      
 
3.1.1.2.  Stage 2 
In the second stage firm i taking the subsidy on R&D as given will max second stage 
profit by choosing iz . 
6 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
( ) 22 ..1.5,0 iii zsq dp --=  
The first order condition is obtained as follows, 
( ) 0..1..20 =--
¶
¶
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¶
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i zs
z
q
q
z
d
p
  
In the symmetric equilibrium ccompji zzz == , the solution related to R&D effort can 
be expressed in the following way;7 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
ccomp
ccomp
etAt
z
W
---
= 0
..2..2..2 gbg
                                                                       (11)  
 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1.2.2..24..1 222 +-----=W bggbgd tsccomp  
 
                                                 
5 See in the appendix (A1) 
6 The second order condition requires ( ) ( ) ( )2222 4.1.2.2 gdbg --- st p while the 
stability condition is satisfied for 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )222 4..12.1..2.2 gdgbbg ---+- st p  or 0fccompW  
7 The expressions for the differentiations are in the appendix  (A4 ) 
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It is presumed that  ( ) 0. 0 fetA -  and    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 01.2..2..24..1 222 f+----- bgbggd ts    
In the symmetric equilibrium,output level  can be expressed in the following way, 
 
( ) ( )
g
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ccomp
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Regarding the model, it should be noted that  ; 
 
· If 00 =Þ= ccompzt . Namely, firms undertake emission reduction only if 
governmnet impose taxes for emission. However, in this presumption R&D 
subsidies are not taken into account. Thus, positive environmental tax 
functions as an incentive for the firms to undertake R&D.  
· 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
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¶
¶ ggbgd
 The equation expressed 
in figures implies an increase in the subsidy which will lead to an increase in 
env R&D. 
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q
ccomp
ccomp  The equation in question indicates the fact that an 
increase on R&D subsidy will give rise to production as well.    
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g
b
 Change in tax has two 
effects on output: direct and indirect effect. An increase in tax has not only a 
direct negatif effect but also has an indirect positive effect on output.  While 
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the first term represents direct effect, the second term symbolizes indirect 
effect. At this point the quesiton that comes into mind is: Which effect 
dominates the other? In general, it is expected  that direct effect will dominate 
ultimately. So,  0p
t
qccomp
¶
¶
 
Substituting  eq (11) into eq (9) ,  in  the symmetric equilibrium output and price for 
given s and t can be shown in the following equation: 
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                                       (12) 
and using eq. (1), 
( ) ccompccompccompccomp qAqqAP .1. gg +-=--=                                               (13) 
3.1.1.3.  Stage 1 
In Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), each firm has produced differentiated 
good and they have supposed that there is representative consumer whose 
preferences for consumption of the two goods 1q , 2q  and numeraire good M is 
described as utility function; 8 
( ) MqqqqqAqAqqU +++-+=
2
..2
..,
2
221
2
1
221121
g
                                           (14) 
The term M stands for the consumption of goods other than good 1 and good 2. By 
horizontal differentiation; it means that brands are not formally ranked among all 
                                                 
8 The inverse demand functions are derived from the utility function.  
iji
i
ji PqqA
q
qqU
=--=
¶
¶
.
),(
g ,{ }ji,  = { }2,1 , i ¹  j   
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consumers given equal prices because of the variety of preferences. When goods are 
substitutes, the degree of substitutability could be interpreted in terms of horizontal 
product differentiation. On the other hand, vertical differentiation is referred to 
quality differentiation usually characterized by consumers’ willingness to pay .For 
vertical differentiation goods, brands are uniformly ranked by all consumers. That is 
higher quality is preferable. iA  measures quality in vertical sense. Other things 
equal, an increase in iA increases marginal utility of consuming good i. Thus utility is 
quadratic in the consumption of q goods and linear in the consumption of other 
goods, 
( ) MqqqqqqAqqU jjiijiji +
++
-+=
2
...2
.),(
22 g
                                                 (15) 
DzzqqUW jiji -+-= )(.5,0),(
22d                                                                        (16) 
 
In equation above, the social welfare is determined total surplus minus R&D cost 
minus environmental damage. In a symmetric equilibrium ( ) ccompccomp zee b+-= 10  
and the social welfare becomes, 
 
( ) fdg ccompcompcccompccompccompccomp qezqqAW 2..1..2 22 --+-=                                       (17)                                       
 
The government maximize ccompW  by choosing both t and s. The first order condition 
requires that 0=
¶
¶
=
¶
¶
s
W
t
W ccompccomp , so 
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The optimal policy combination ( )ccompccomp st ,  is, 9 
ccomp
ccomp
ccomp e
q
t -= f                                                                                                      (20) 
Parallel to what is expected , the second best tax is below marginal damage. 
( )
( )( )1.4.
.2..2
1
2 +-
-
-=
bgf
bgccomp
ccomp
t
s                                                                                      (21)       
As it is supposed, second best emission tax should be below marginal damage. It is 
well known that a corrective tax on polluting activities equals to marginal social 
damage internalizes the social cost of firms’ negative externalities. But this situation 
exists when a regulator has full information and the externality generating industry is 
competitive. 
Because of the interaction between over production due to pollution externality and 
under production owing to market power, optimal emission tax is less than marginal 
social damage. (Output-distortion effect) The internalization of externality burden 
constitutes an extra cost; the firm decreases its output, which in turn leads to higher 
prices. As a result, it can be stated that consumers are affected by two factors in 
negative means: increasing price level and negative externality.  
The optimal subsidy depends on the degree of product differentiation and on 
spillover parameter. Another result obtained in this model indicates the fact that 
subsidy increases when the deviation between emission tax and marginal pollution 
damage increases.  
If the firms take into account of their interests, they under- invest in environmental 
R&D. (the undervaluation effect) In this case, the regulator (government) impose 
positive subsidy to encourage the firm for investing in environmental R&D. Thus, 
subsidy should be positive. At this point subsidy plays role to help correct the 
suboptimal environmental R&D. In addition, Inasmuch as there is technological 
spillover, it could be asserted a question of free-rider effect. The firms can not 
                                                 
9 All steps are presented in the appendix (A18) and (A19) 
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internalize the externality appeared from spillover. Hence, the firms will under-invest 
in environmental R&D. 
When social returns exceed private ones, R&D is secured as positive and an under 
investment in R&D can be expected. On the one hand, firms get positive subsidy by 
undertaking under- investment on R&D; on the other hand, they maximize their profit 
by minimizing their R&D expenditure. 
It could be stated that spillover parameter is low and product differentiation 
parameter is high optimal subsidy is negative .In the expression of subsidy, the term 
of 
( )
( )( )1.4
.2..2
2 +-
-
bg
bgt
 reflects strategic effect. If the strategic effect dominates the output 
distortion effect ,the subsidy could be negative. In this situation, the firms want to                       
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capture all benefits of being the first firm to introduce the new technology. Hence,the 
firms would over-invest in environmental R&D  
 
3.1.2. Under Cooperative R&D 
It is analyzed that the situation in that firms act cooperatively at the stage R&D (stage 2) 
only. Accordingly, firms set their R&D cooperatively to maximize joint first stage profit 
while competing in the third stage. In addition, Research Joint Venture (RJV) is 
considered. Furthermore, it is admitted that within RJV there exists full information 
sharing of research result and spillover is set its max value (b  = 1). Finally,last stage of 
the game is solved in the same way as it has been done  in the case of competitive R&D. 
3.1.2.1.  Stage 3 
Given the policy scheme  (t,s) announced by the governments and the choice of R&D 
effort in emission reduction iz , firm i maximizes following profit by choosing its output 
level; 
( ) ( ) ( ) 22 ..1.5,0......5,0.1... iiiijiiiiii zsqetqqqAzsqetqP dgdp -----=---=       (6) 
The first order condition is obtained as follows, 
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The reaction functions are obtained as follows,      
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( )
2
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( )
2
.. 0 iij
j
qzzetA
q
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=                                                                                (22b)                            
 
Solving simultaneously eq. (22a) and eq. (22b) Cournot-Nash eq.output levels are 
obtained as follows, 
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q    , { }ji,  = { }2,1 , i ¹  j                                                      (23)                                         
 
*
iq  is Cournot-Nash Equilibrium output 
3.1.2.2. Stage 2 
In the second stage the firms taking the subsidy on R&D as given will max second stage 
profit by choice iz .  
( ) ( ) ( ) 2222 ..1.5,0..1.5,0 jjiijirjv zsqzsq ddppp --+--=+=                                 (24) 
 
The first order condition is obtained as follows, 
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0=
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pp
  which in symmetric equilibrium  ccoopji zzz == , the solution related 
to R&D effort can be expressed in the following way, 8 
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where ( ) ( ) 22 .8.1.2 tsccoop --+=W dg   
 
In the symmetric equilibrium,output level  can be expressed in the following way, 
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It should be noted that , 
 
·  00 =Þ= ccoopzt  It means that if emission is not taxed, firms will not invest in 
environmental R&D. 
                                                
8 All steps are presented in the appendix (A23) 
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· 
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  That means when emission tax is given, an 
increase in subsidy is observed which will in turn lead to an increase in 
environmental R&D.  
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  That indicates if subsidy on R&D increases, 
production will also increase. 
 
If (26) is substituted into (23), the following equation is found; 
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( ) ccoopccoop qAP .1 g+-=                                                                                             (28) 
3.1.2.3  Stage 1 
The government would like to maximize welfare by choosing t and s. In a symmetric 
equilibrium ( ) ccoopccoop zee b+-= 10  and the social welfare becomes, 
( ) fdg ccoopccoopccoopccoopccoopccoop qezqqAW 2..1..2 22 --+-=                                      (17)    
 
The first order condition requires that 0=
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The optimal policy combination ( )ccoopccoop st ,  is  9 
 
ccoop
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q
t -= f                                                                                                       (31)    
 
( )fg .2
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-= ccoopccoop
t
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It is showed that the emission tax is less than marginal damage. This result is the same 
with emission tax with expression under competitive R&D. If eq (32) is taken into 
consideration, it can be revealed that subsidy is always positive. The regulator 
encourages the firms to coordinate and eliminate duplication of efforts while completely 
internalizing R&D spillover. This in turn leads to more efficient use of their resources. 
                                                
9 All steps are presented in the appendix (A38) and (A39) 
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This  fact can be regarded as vital due to the fact that social returns exceed private 
returns. On the one hand, firms get positive subsidy by making under investment on 
R&D; on the other hand, they maximize their profit by minimizing their R&D 
expenditure. Explicitly, the firms consider their private benefits more than social 
benefits. 
 
 
3.2.  BERTRAND  CASE 
3.2.1. Under Competitive R&D  
 
Direct demand function,  
 
( ) ( )[ ]jii PPAq .1..1
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gg
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û
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ê
ë
é
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=                                                                            (2)    
 
To facilitate comparasion with the Cournot case, k will be used to show emission tax 
and v  will be employed to illustrate subsidy. Hence, 
3.2.1.1.  Stage 3 
Each firm maximizes following profit by choosing their appropriate price level. 
( ) 2..1.5,0... iiiii zvqekqP dp ---=                                                                              (33)             
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The first order condition is obtained as follows, 
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The reaction functions are obtained as follows,      
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Solving simultaneously eq.(35a) and (35b) equilibrium price level  is obtained as 
follows, 
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By using eq.(2) and (35a) into eq(33), maximum overall profit is obtained as follows 
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3.2.1.2.  Stage 2 
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Firm i  taking the subsidy on R&D as given will maximize second stage profit by 
choosing its R&D level. 10 
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The first order condition is obtained as follows,  
 
( )
( ) 0..1
1
....2
0 2 =---
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
--
Þ=
¶
¶
i
i
i
i
i
ii
i
i zv
z
P
z
e
kekP
z
d
g
p
                                       (38)  
 
In the symmetric equilibrium bcompji zzz == ; the solution related to R&D effort can be 
expressed in the following way,11 
 
 
( )( )
bcomp
bcomp
ekAk
z
W
---
=
gbg .2....2 20                                                                        (39) 
 
where   ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )gbgbdggg .2.1..2.2.4.1.1 222 --+----+=W kvbcomp                                       
 
                                                
10 The second order condition requires 
( ) ( ) ( )( )222222 4.1.1.2.2 ggdbgg ----- vk p while the stability condition 
is satisfied for 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )gggdbbgg --+-+-- 24.1.11..2.2 222 vk p  
11 All steps are presented in the appendix (A42) 
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In the symmetric equilibrium, price level  can be expressed in the following way, 
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          It should be stated that; 
 
· k = 0  then 0=bcompz  The formula implies that if emissions are not taxed, firms 
will not invest in environmental  R&D. 
· 
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bcomp    The formula implies the fact that if 
subsidy  increases, price will decrease. This situation points an opposite effect 
than Cournot. 
 
In the symmetric equilibrium,output level  can be expressed in the following way 
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It would be practical to stress that a change in tax has two effects on output: direct and 
indirect effect. An increase in tax has a direct negative effect on output. Nonetheless, it 
has an indirect positive effect on output as well. In this regard, first term represents 
direct effect, second term represents indirect effect. At this point, the model focuses on 
the following question: Which effect dominates the other? In general, it is expected that 
direct effect will dominate ultimately. Hence , 0p
k
qbcomp
¶
¶
. 
By substituting eq (39) into (36), price level for the given k and v is formulated in the 
following symmetric equilibrium:  
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3.2.1.3.  Stage 1  
In this section government (regulator) sets up v and k so as to maximize welfare that is 
defined as total surplus minus R&D cost minus environmental damage. 
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In a symmetric equilibrium ( ) bcompbcomp zee b+-= 10 and the social welfare becomes, 
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The optimal policy combination ( )bcompbcomp vk ,  is,12   
( )
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Analyzing the equations stated above, it can be posited that second best emission tax 
should be below marginal damages. Eq (64) shows that emission tax is affected directly 
by product differentiation degree. When g is close to zero, fpk ; whereas, when g is 
close to one, f=k . The figure points out that emission tax equals to marginal damage 
(first best rule). This situation could exist in perfectly competitive market. This 
conclusion remind Bertrand Paradox. 13  
Beside eq. (64), eq (65) shows that the subsidy cannot be negative. Furthermore, when 
the deviation between emission tax and marginal pollution damage increases, subsidy 
also increases.  
Note that, when 0=g the goods are independent so that each firm acts like a local 
monopoly. As a result, the emission tax and the R&D subsidy are the same in both 
Cournot and Bertrand Competition. 
 
                                                
12 All steps are presented in the appendix (A61) and (A62) 
13 Despite of the fact that firms are market power, price equals to marginal cost when products are 
homogenous. 
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3.2.2. Under Cooperative R&D  
At R&D stage (Stage 2), the firms acting cooperatively are examined. From this 
perspective firms set their R&D cooperatively to maximize joint first stage profit while 
they compete in the third stage. In the stage 2, Research Joint Venture (RJV) is 
considered. Furthermore, within the RJV there exists full information sharing of research 
result and spillover is set its max value (b  = 1).  
Last stage of the game is solved in the same way as it has been done in the case of 
competitive R&D. 
3.2.2.1.  Stage 3 
Each firm maximizes following profits by choosing their price level. 
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The first order condition is obtained as follows, 
( )[ ]
Þ=
-
++--
Þ=
¶
¶
0
1
...21.
0
g
ggp iji
i
i
ekPPA
P
                                                      (50) 
 
The reaction functions are obtained as follows, 
 
( ) ( )
2
..1. 0 jij
i
zzekPA
P
--++-
=
gg
   Reaction Function for firm i                    (51a) 
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( ) ( )
2
..1. 0 iji
j
zzekPA
P
--++-
=
gg
  Reaction Function for firm j                     (51b)                 
 
Solving simultaneously eq.(51a) and eq. (51b) equilibrium price level  is obtained as 
follows, 
 
( )
g
g
-
--+-
=
2
...1. 0* ij
i
zkzkkeA
P ,  { }ji,  = { }2,1 , i ¹ j                                           (52)                                   
 
By using eq.(2) and (51a) into eq(49), it is obtained maximum overall profit:  
              
( ) ( ) 2
2
2
..1.5,0
1
.
i
ii
i zv
ekP
d
g
p --
-
-
=                                                                             (53)   
3.2.2.2.  Stage 2 
The firms taking the subsidy on R&D as given will maximize second stage profit by 
choosing their R&D level. 
The objective function of the RJV can be expressed in the following way , 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 22
2
2
2
2
21 ..1.5,0..1.5,01
.
1
.
ji
jjii
rjv zvzv
ekPekP
dd
gg
ppp ----
-
-
+
-
-
=+=         (54) 
 
The first order condition is obtained as follows,  
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In the symmetric equilibrium, bcoopji zzz == , the solution related to R&D effort can be 
expressed in the following way,14 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )gdgg
g
----+
--
=
1..8.1.2.1
..1..4
22
0
kv
keAk
zbcoop                                                            (56) 
 
In the symmetric equilibrium, price level  can be expressed in the following way, 
 
( )
g
g
-
-+-
=
2
.2.1. 0 bcoop
bccop
zkkeA
P       
 
 
Note that; 
 
                                                
14 All steps are presented in the appendix (A66) 
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· 0=k  then 0=bcoopz  That means if emissions are not taxed, firms will not invest 
in environmental  R&D. 
 
· 
( )( )( )
0
.2.1....4 220 f
bcoop
bcoop ekAk
v
z
W
---
=
¶
¶ dgg
    Thus; if subsidy increases, it will  
lead to an increase in R&D. 
 
· 0
2
..2
p
g-
¶
¶
-
=
¶
¶ v
z
k
v
P
bcoop
bcoop    The formula explains the fact that if subsidy 
increases, price will decrease. This situation indicates an opposite effect than 
Cournot.                                                                        
By substituting eq (56) into (52), price level for the given k and v is formulated in the 
following symmetric equilibrium; 
  
( ) ( )( )
( ) bcoopbcoop
keAkkeA
P
W-
--
-
-
+-
=
.2
..1..8
2
.1. 0
2
0
g
g
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g
                                                       (57)         
 
( ) ( )( )
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=
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2
.1.
.
1
1 0
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0
g
g
g
g
g
                                    (58) 
3.2.2.3.  Stage 1 
In this section governments (regulator) set up v and k in order to maximize welfare that 
is defined as total surplus minus R&D cost minus environmental damage. 
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( )
2
...2
.),(
22
jjii
jiji
qqqq
qqAqqU
++
-+=
g
                                                         (59) 
 
DzzqqUW jiji -+-= )(.5,0),(
22d                                                                        (60)              
 
In a symmetric equilibrium ( ) bcoopbcoop zee b+-= 10  and the social welfare becomes, 
 
( ) fdg bcoopbcoopbcoopbcoopbcoopbcoop qezqqAW 2..1..2 22 --+-=                                     (61) 
 
The first order condition requires that 0=
¶
¶
=
¶
¶
v
W
k
W bcoopbcoop , 
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The optimal policy combination ( )bcoopbcoop vk ,  is15 
 
( )
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop e
q
k .1 2gf --=                                                                                          (64) 
( )
( )fg
g
.2
1.2
1
-
-
-= bcoopbcoop
k
v                                                                                           (65) 
 
Handling the equations stated above, it can be claimed that second best emission tax 
should be below marginal damages due to negative externality of pollution. Eq (83) 
shows that emission tax is affected directly by product differentiation degree. When g is 
close to zero, fpk whereas when g is close to one f=k . The figure points out that 
emission tax equals to marginal damage (first best rule). This situation could exist in 
perfectly competitive market.  
 
 
                                                
15 All steps are presented in the appendix (A85) and (A86) 
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APPENDIX A 
Derivation of Expression (10) 
( ) ( ) ( ) Þ-----=---= 22 ..5,0.1......5.0.1... iiiijiiiiii zsqetqqqAzsqetqP dgdp  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 22 ..5,0.1...5,0.1... iiiiijii zsqKzsqetqqA ddgp --=-----=  
           
where iji etqqAK .. ---= g  
 
Substituting eq.(7) into K   
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--
=
----
---= i
jijji
ij q
qetAqzzetA
etqAK
2
..
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...
.. 0
ggb
g  
 
( ) 22 ..1.5,0 iii zsq dp --=                                                                                       (A1) 
Derivation of Expression (11)  
The first order condition is ; 
 
( ) 0..1..20 =--
¶
¶
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¶
¶
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z
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q
z
d
p
                                                                           (A2) 
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 From eq (9)            
( )
24
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g
bg
-
-
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¶
¶ t
z
q
i
i                                                                        (A3)                         
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In the symmetric equilibrium, ccompji zzz == , substituting eq (A3) and eq(9)  into eq 
(A2),  
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where  ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )[ ]1.2.2..24..1 222 +-----=W bggbgd tsccomp  
Derivation of Expression of (20) and (21) 
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Using   eq (3)     ( )b+-=
¶
¶
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ccomp         If it is substituted  eq.(3) into 
previous eq. it is attained , 
 
( )
t
zte
t
q ccompccompccomp
¶
¶
+
+
+
+
-
=
¶
¶
.
2
1.
)2( g
b
g
                                                                    (A7)     
 
 
Substituting eq.(A7) and eq (A6) into (A5) it is reached, 
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and using eq (13) it is attained, 
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In addition, 
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eq (A6) and equ (13) substitute  in to eq (A9) and some arrangement it is obtained, 
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substituting eq (A11) into eq (A10) it is reached, 
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It should be kept in mind that , 0f
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When eq (A13) and (A8) are analyzed, it is found that  
ccompccompccompccomp ePeP .0..2.2 ff =Þ=-                                                                   (A14)      
From eq  (A13) and eq  (A14) the subsequent equation is obtained; 
ccompccomp zq .)1.(. dbf =+                                                                                              (A15)      
Eq (A14) and eq (A15) show the structure of the optimal policy scheme. 
Eq (A14) connotes that price equals to marginal environmental damage per unit of 
output.   
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Eq (A15) says that the marginal R&D cost equal marginal saving from  R&D  in 
environmental damage because ccomp
ccomp
ccomp
ccomp qz
e
q ... ff
¶
¶
-=     
At the optimal policy combination (t*, s*), it is expected that the  firms’ first order 
conditions must satisfy the optimum condition identified above. 
From eq (7) 
2
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qetA
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F.o.c of the second stage:  
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From eq (A14) and eq (A16) , the optimal emission tax is obtained as the following; 
ccomp
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q
tetqeetqP -=Þ+=Þ+= ff *...                       (A18)                             
In addition, using eq.(A15) and eq.(A17), the optimal subsid y is attained as the 
following, 
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Derivation of Expression of (26) 
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 From eq (9),it is attained eq. (A21),(A22), 
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If it is substituted eq. (A21),(A22) into eq. (A20), it is found, 
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In the symmetric equilibrium ccoopji zzz ==     and substituting  (23), 
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where ( ) ( ) 22 .8.1.2 tsccoop --+=W dg                             
 
Derivation of Expression of (31) and (32) 
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From eq (3 ) ,it is reached  ccoopccoopccoopccoop zezzee .2. 00 -=--= b                                                                          
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 73 
and   
g+
¶
¶
++-
=
¶
¶
2
..2.20 t
z
tze
t
q
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop  . When it is substituted  eq (3), it is obtained 
 
t
zte
t
q ccoopccoopccoop
¶
¶
+
+
+
-
=
¶
¶
gg 2
..2
2
                                                               (A27)     
 
Substitute (A27) and (A26) into (A25),it is found 
 
( )[ ] [ ] Þ=
¶
¶
--ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
¶
¶
+
+
+
-
-+-Þ=
¶
¶
0...2.
2
..2
2
...1..0
t
z
qz
t
zte
eqA
t
W ccoop
ccoopccoop
ccoopccoop
ccoopccoop
ccoop fd
gg
fg  
 
and using eq (28), it is secured 
 
( ) ( )
( )
0...2.
2
...2
..
2
=
¶
¶
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+-
+
-
+-
+
-
=
¶
¶
t
z
qz
ePt
eP
e
t
W
ccoop
ccoopccoop
ccoopccoop
ccoopccoop
ccoopccoop
fd
g
f
f
g
         (A28) 
 
In addition, 
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( )
0....2...2
...2..1.2..20
=
¶
¶
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
+-
¶
¶
Þ=
¶
¶
s
z
z
e
q
s
q
e
s
z
z
s
q
q
s
q
A
s
W
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
c
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoopccoop
ff
dg
          (A29) 
 
( )[ ]
0.....
...10
=
¶
¶
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
-
+
¶
¶
-+-Þ=
¶
¶
s
z
z
e
q
s
z
z
s
q
eqA
s
W
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoopccoop
ccoop
fd
fg
       (A30)                        
 
From eq.(23) ,it is attained       
s
zt
s
q ccoopccoop
¶
¶
+
=
¶
¶
.
2
.2
g
                                              (A31)                                         
 
Substitute  eq (A26) ,eq (28) and eq (A31) into eq (A29) and some arrangement,it is 
obtained 
 
( )
0...2.
2
...2
=
¶
¶
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+-
+
-
=
¶
¶
s
z
qz
ePt
s
W ccoop
ccoopccoop
ccoopccoopccoop fd
g
f
                           (A32) 
 
0f
s
zccoop
¶
¶
  (stage 2 has been already shown ), so  
 
( )
...2.
2
...2
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+-
+
-
ccoopccoop
cccoop qz
ePt
fd
g
f
must be equal to zero.                                 (A33)                         
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From eq (A28) and (A33)     
ccoopccoopccoopccoop ePeP .0. ff =Þ=-                                                                           (A34)  
From eq (A33) and (A34)     
ccoopccoopccoopccoop qzqz ..2.0..2. fdfd =Þ=+-                                                           (A35)        
 
Eq (A34) and eq (A35) determine the structure of the optimal policy. Eq (A34) states 
that price equals to marginal environmental damage per unit of output.  
Eq (A35) brings clarification to the fact that marginal R&D cost equals to marginal 
saving in environmental damage from R&D due to ccoop
ccoop
ccoop
ccoop qz
e
q ...2
¶
¶
-= ff   
At the optimal policy combination (t*, s*), the firms’ first order conditions must satisfy  
the optimum condition identified above. 
In the symmetric equilibrium;  
( ) ccoopccoopccoopccoopccoopccoop etqPetqAq ...1 +=Þ-+-= g                                (A36) 
 
F.o.c of the second stage eq (25)   
 
( )( ) ccoopccoop zsqt ..1.2..4 dg -+=                                                                                    (A37) 
 
Using(A34) and (A36),it is obtained 
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ccoop
ccoop
ccoopccoopccoopccoop e
q
tetqe -=Þ+= ff *..                                                              (A38)                      
 
Using (A35) and (A37), it is reached  
( ) ( ) ( )fgfg .2
.21..1.2.2..4 *
+
-=Þ-+= tsqsqt ccoopccoopccoop                                          (A39)            
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APPENDIX B  
Derivation of Expression of (39) 
( ) ( ) 22
2
..1.5,0
1
.
i
ii
i zv
ekP
d
g
p --
-
-
=                                                                                (A39)       
 
 
The first order condition,  
 
( )
( ) 0..1
1
....2
0 2 =---
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
--
Þ=
¶
¶
i
i
i
i
i
ii
i
i zv
z
P
z
e
kekP
z
d
g
p
                                          (A40)  
 
 
From eq (36), 
( )
24
.2.
g
gb
-
+-
=
¶
¶ k
z
P
i
i  and from eq (3), 1-=
¶
¶
i
i
z
e
.  If it is used this eq. into 
eq.(40), 
 
( ) ( )
( ) 0..1
1
4
.2....2
0 2
2
=--
-
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
+-+-
Þ=
¶
¶
i
ii
i
i zv
kkekP
z
d
g
g
gb
p
and some arrangement, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) iii
i
i zvkkekP
z
.4.1.1.2.4....20 222 dgggbg
p
---=+---Þ=
¶
¶
            (A41) 
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If it is substituted  eq (36) and eq (3) into eq. (A41) 
 
In the symmetric equilibrium; bcompji zzz == , it is obtained, 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
i
zvkkk
zk
zkkekeA
z
.4.1.1.2...4
.
1.4..
1.2..4..2..2.1.
0
2222
2
2
00
dgggbg
bg
bgggggp
---=+--+
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
+-
-++---+++-
Þ=
¶
¶
 
          
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] bcomp
bcomp
i zkvekAk
z
gbgbdggggbg
p
.2.1..2.2.4.1.1.2....20 22220 --+---+-=---Þ=¶
¶  
 
some arrangement it is reached, 
 
  ( )( )
bcomp
bcomp
ekAk
z
W
---
=
gbg .2....2 20                                                                      (A42)                 
 
where   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )gbgbdggg .2.1..2.24.1.1 2222 --+----+=W kvbcomp  
 
Derivation of Expression of (47) and (48) 
( )
0....2...2
...2.1..2..20
=
¶
¶
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
+-
¶
¶
Þ=
¶
¶
k
z
z
e
q
k
q
e
k
z
z
k
q
q
k
q
A
k
W
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcompbcomp
ff
dg
      (A43) 
 
Using eq. (3)  
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( )b+-=
¶
¶
1
bcomp
bcomp
z
e
                                                                                                       (A44)     
 
When it is substituted  eq. (A44)  into eq. (A43)and some arrangement it is attained, 
 
( )[ ]
( )[ ] 0.1...2...2
...21..2..20
=
¶
¶
++-
+
¶
¶
-+-Þ=
¶
¶
k
z
qz
k
q
eqA
k
W
bcomp
bcompbcomp
bcomp
bcompbcomp
bcomp
bfd
fg
          (A45)                                
 
Using   
( )( )
gg
g
+
-
=
-
--
=
11
1.
2
bcompbcomp
bcomp
PAPA
q    eached following eq., 
 
k
P
k
q bcompbcomp
¶
¶
+
-=
¶
¶
.
1
1
g
                                                                                            (A46)                                
 
Using eq (36) and eq (3),obtained  
 
( )
k
zke
k
P bcompbcompbcomp
¶
¶
-
+
-
-
=
¶
¶
.
2
1.
2 g
b
g
                                                                     (A47)  
 
Substituting eq (A47) into eq (A46) it is secured,  
 
( )
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
¶
¶
-
+
-
-+
-=
¶
¶
k
zke
k
q bcompbcompbcomp .
2
1.
2
.
1
1
g
b
gg
                                                         (A48)       
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Substituted . eq (A48) into eq  (A45) it is found, 
 
( )[ ] ( )
( )[ ] Þ=
¶
¶
++-+
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
¶
¶
-
+-
-
-+-
+
-Þ=
¶
¶
0.1...2...2
.
2
1.
2
...21..2..2.
1
10
k
z
qz
k
zkeeqA
k
W
bcomp
bcompbcomp
bcompbcomp
bcompbcomp
bcomp
bfd
g
b
g
fg
g  
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0.1..2.1
.1
..
2.1
..
=
¶
¶
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
++-+
-+
+
-
+
-+
--
=
¶
¶
k
z
qz
k
eP
ePe
k
W
bcomp
bcompbcompbcompbcomp
bcompbcompbcompbcomp
bfd
gg
b
f
gg
f
              (A49) 
 
In addition, 
 
( )
0....2...2
...2..1.2..20
=
¶
¶
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
+-
¶
¶
Þ=
¶
¶
v
z
z
e
q
v
q
e
v
z
z
v
q
q
v
q
A
v
W
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcompbcomp
ff
dg
         (A50) 
 
Subs eq (A44) into eq (A50) and some arrangement it is reached, 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] 0.1.......1.0 =
¶
¶
++-+
¶
¶
-+-Þ=
¶
¶
v
z
qz
v
q
eqA
v
W bcomp
bcompbcomp
bcomp
bcompbcomp
bcomp bfdfg    (A51) 
 
Using 
( )( )
gg
g
+
-
=
-
--
=
11
1.
2
bcompbcomp
bcomp
PAPA
q       it is found, 
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v
P
v
q bcompbcomp
¶
¶
+
-=
¶
¶
.
1
1
g
                                                                                            (A52) 
 
Using eq. (36)  
 
( ) ( )
v
zk
v
P bcompbcomp
¶
¶
-
++
-=
¶
¶
.
4
2.1.
2g
gb
   and                                                                (A53)              
 
Subs. eq.(A53) into eq. (A52) ,it is reached                                                     
 
( )
( )( ) v
zk
v
q bcompbcomp
¶
¶
+-
+
=
¶
¶
.
1.2
1.
gg
b
                                                                                  (A54)       
 
If it is  substituted. eq (A54) into eq.(A51) and some arrangementit is attained, 
 
( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )
( )[ ] Þ=
¶
¶
++-
+
¶
¶
+-
+
-+-Þ=
¶
¶
0.1...
.
1.2
1.
...1.0
v
z
qz
v
zk
eqA
v
W
bcomp
bcompbcomp
bcomp
bcompbcomp
bcomp
bfd
gg
b
fg
 
 
                                                                                                             
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0.1...2.1
..1.
=
¶
¶
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
++-+
-+
-+
=
¶
¶
v
z
qz
ePk
v
W bcomp
bcompbcomp
bcompbcompbcomp bfd
gg
fb
     (A55) 
 
0f
v
zbcomp
¶
¶
, so  
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From eq(A55) 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )[ ]úû
ù
ê
ë
é
++-+
-+
-+
1...
2.1
..1.
bfd
gg
fb
bcompbcomp
bcompb qz
ePk
must be zero (A56)    
From eq (A49) and (A56)  
( ) 0..1 =-+- bcompbcomp eqA fg  using eq.(1), f.bcompbcomp eP =                                     (A57)                              
From (A55) and (A57)  
( ) ( )1...01... +=Þ=++- bfdbfd bcompbcompbcompbcomp qzqz                                     (A58)          
Based on the equations in question, it can be said that eq (A57) and eq (A58) determine 
the structure of the optimal policy.  
As regards this optiamal policy, eq (A57) demonstrates that price equals to marginal 
environmental damage per unit of output. 
Eq. (A58) connotes the fact  that marginal R&D cost equals to marginal saving in 
environmental damage from R&D because of bcomp
bcomp
bcomp
bcomp qz
e
q ....2 ÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
¶
¶
-= ff    
At the optimal policy combination (k*, v*), the firms’ first order conditions must satisfy  
the optimum condition identified above. 
In the symmetric equilibrium;  
F.o.c  of  Stage 3 from eq.(34)  
( )
Þ=
-
++--
0
1
...21.
g
gg iji ekPPA   
( ) ( ) bcompbcompbcomp ekPAP ..11. +---= gg                                                             (A59)    
Stage 2    f.o.c from eq(38)   
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ) bcompbcompbcomp zvkkkekP ..4.1.1..4.2....2 222 dggggb ---=-++--        
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From eq(A59) ( ) ( ) ( ) bcompbcompbcompbcompbcomp ekqekPAP ..1..11. 2 +-=+---= ggg     
substitute this eq into above 
( ) ( )( ) bcompbcomp zqk ..4.1..2.2 22 dggggb --=++-                                                 (A60)   
From eq (A57) and eq (A59)  
( ) ( ) ( )
bcomp
bcomp
bcompbcompbcompbcomp e
q
kekPAe .1..11.. 2* gfggf --=Þ+---=                 (A61)   
 From eq (A58) and eq (A60) 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) Þ+--=++- 1...4.1..2..2 22 bfgggb bcompbcomp qvqk  
 
( )
( ) ( )1..4
.2..21
2
2
*
+-
---=
bfg
ggbkvbcomp                                                                                     (A62)                              
                                                        
Derivation of Expression of (56) 
                                                                                          
( ) ( )
( ) 0..1
1
....2
1
....2
0 22 =---
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
-
+
-
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
-
Þ=
¶
¶
i
i
j
j
j
jj
i
i
i
i
ii
rjv zv
z
P
z
e
kekP
z
P
z
e
kekP
zi
d
gg
p
   (A63)           
 
From eq (52),  
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g-
-
=
¶
¶
2
k
z
P
i
i                                                                                                                  (A64)           
                 
g-
-=
¶
¶
2
k
z
P
i
j                                                                                                                 (A65)    
                                                                                                                
Subs eq.(A65) and eq.(A64) and and from eq (3), 1-=¶
¶
=
¶
¶
j
j
i
i
z
e
z
e
  into eq.(A63) and 
some arrangement it is obtained 
 
( ) ( )
( ) Þ=--
-
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
-
+-
+
-
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
-
+-
Þ=
¶
¶
0..1
1
2
...2
1
2
...2
0 22 i
jjii
i
rjv zv
k
kekP
k
kekP
z
d
g
g
g
gp
 
 
( ) ( )( )( ) 0..12.1...20 =--+=-+-Þ=
¶
¶
iijii
i
rjv zvekPekPk
z
dgg
p
 
 
In the symmetric equilibrium, 1, === bbcoopji zzz  and also  subs. eq. (52) and eq (3), 
it is found following equation, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ) 0..12.11...41...21..2.20 20 =--+=-+---Þ=¶
¶
bcoopbcoop
bcoop
rjv zvzkkeAk
z
dggggg
p
 
 
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )gdgg
g
----+
--
=
1..8.1.2.1
..1..4
22
0
kv
keAk
zbcoop                                                          (A66) 
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Derivation of Expression of (64) and (65) 
( )
0....2...2
...2.1..2..20
=
¶
¶
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
+-
¶
¶
Þ=
¶
¶
k
z
z
e
q
k
q
e
k
z
z
k
q
q
k
q
A
k
W
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoopbcoop
ff
dg
      (A67)                
 
Using eq.(3) , 2-=
¶
¶
bcoop
bcoop
z
e
                                                                                         (A68)            
 
Substitute eq (A68) into eq(A67) and some arrangement following expression is 
attained,   
 
( )[ ]
[ ] 0...4...2
...21..2.20
=
¶
¶
+-
+
¶
¶
-+-Þ=
¶
¶
k
z
qz
k
q
eqA
k
W
bcoop
bcoopbcoop
bcoop
bcoopbcoop
bcoop
fd
fg
      (A69)         
 
Using 
( )( )
gg
g
+
-
=
-
--
=
11
1.
2
bcoopbcoop
bcoop
PAPA
q ,   reached following equation, 
 
k
P
k
q bcoopbcoop
¶
¶
+
-=
¶
¶
.
1
1
g
                                                                                             (A70) 
 
Using 
k
zkze
k
P bcoopbcoopbcoop
¶
¶
-
-
-
-
-
=
¶
¶
.
2
.2
2
.2
2
0
ggg
      and using eq.(3), it is found  
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k
zke
k
P bcoopbcoopbcoop
¶
¶
-
-
-
=
¶
¶
.
2
.2
2 gg
                                                                                   (A71)  
 
Subs.eq (A71) into eq (A70)  
 
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
¶
¶
-
-
-+
-=
¶
¶
k
zke
k
q bcoopbcoopbcoop .
2
.2
2
.
1
1
ggg
                                                                    (A72)     
 
and subs.eq (A72) into eq (A69) 
 
( )[ ] [ ] 0...2...
2
.2
2
.
1
1...10 =
¶
¶
+-+ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
¶
¶
-
-
-+
--Þ=
¶
¶
k
z
qz
k
zkeeP
k
W bcoop
bcoopbcoop
bcoopbcoop
bcoopbcoop
bcoop fd
ggg
f  
 
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( ) 0...2.1.2
.2
..
1.2
..
=
¶
¶
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+-+
+-
-
+
+-
--
=
¶
¶
k
z
qz
k
eP
ePe
k
W
bcoop
bcoopbcoopbcoopbcoop
bcoopbcoopbcoopbcoop
fd
gg
f
gg
f
            (A73)    
 
In addition, 
 
( )
0....2..2
...2..1.2..20
=
¶
¶
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
+-
¶
¶
Þ=
¶
¶
v
z
z
e
q
v
q
e
v
z
z
v
q
q
v
q
A
v
W
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoopbcoop
ff
dg
          (A74) 
 
subs eq (A68)  and some arrangement,   
 
 88 
( )[ ] [ ] 0...2....10 =
¶
¶
+-+
¶
¶
-+-Þ=
¶
¶
v
z
qz
v
q
eqA
v
W bcoop
bcoopbcoop
bcoop
bcoopbcoop
bcoop fdfg   (A75)                        
 
Eq (A53) for 1=b , 
v
zk
v
P bcoopbcoop
¶
¶
-
-=
¶
¶
.
2
.2
g
                                                            (A76)                            
  
Subs. (A76) into (A52) it is found                                                     
 
( )( ) v
zk
v
q bcoopbcoop
¶
¶
-+
=
¶
¶
.
2.1
.2
gg
                                                                                   (A77)       
 
If it is Substituted. eq (A77) into eq (A75) it is obtained , 
 
( )
( ) ( ) 0...2.1.2
...2
=
¶
¶
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+-+
+-
-
=
¶
¶
v
z
qz
ePk
v
W bcoop
bcoopbcoop
bcoopbcoopbcoop fd
gg
f
                           (A78) 
It should be kept in mind that 0f
v
zbcoop
¶
¶
, so 
 
( )
( )( ) úû
ù
ê
ë
é
+-+
+-
-
bcoopbcoop
bcoopbcoop qz
ePk
..2.
1.2
...2
fd
gg
f
  must be zero.                                      (A79)                 
 
From eq (A79) and eq (A73); 
 
f.bcoopbcoop eP =                                                                                                             (A80)         
  
 From eq (79) and eq (A80)  
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bcoopbcoop qz ..2. fd =                                                                                                       (A81)         
 
Eq (A80) and eq (A81) show the structure of the optimal policy.  
Eq (A80) states that price equals to marginal environmental damage per unit of output. 
Eq (A81) indicates that marginal R&D cost equals to marginal saving in environmental 
damage from R&D because of bcoop
bcoop
bcoop
bcoop qz
e
q ....2
¶
¶
-= ff   
According to the optimal policy combination (k*, v*), it is expected that the firms’ first 
order conditions must satisfy the optimum condition identified above.   
 
F.o.c of the stage 3, from eq (50)  :
( )
Þ=
-
++--
0
1
...21.
g
gg bcoopbcoopbcoop ekPPA     
 
( ) ( ) bcoopbcoopbcoop ekPAP .1.1. +---= gg                                                             (A82)        
 
 F.o.c of the stage 2, eq (A64) and eq (A65) substitute into  eq (55):  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) Þ-=
-
-
-
-+
-
-
-
- ijjii zv
k
k
ekP
k
k
ekP ..1
1
2...2
1
2...2 22 dg
g
g
g     
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) bcoopbcoopbcoop zvekPk ..1.2.1...4 dgg --+=-                                                       (A83)   
From eq (A80) and eq (A82), 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) Þ---=Þ+---= bcoopbcoopbcoopbcoopbcoopbcoop PAeekekPAe .1...1.1.. gfggf
    
 ( )
bcoop
bcoop
bccop e
q
k .1 2* gf --=                                                                                          (A84)   
Substitute eq (A82) into eq (A83). 
   
( )[ ] ( )( ) bcoopbcoop qvqk ..1.2.1.4 dgg --=-                                                             (A85)   
 
From eq (A81) and eq (A85) also with some arrangement it is attained, 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) Þ--=- bcoopbcoop qvqk ..2.1.2.1.4 fgg  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Þ---=-Þ--=- ggffgfgg 1..22...21.21..2 kvvk                                                                                                                                     
  
( )
( )fg
g
.2
1.2
1*
-
-
-=
k
vbcoop                                                                                           (A86)                                                            
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